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TORT LAW-FoRECASTS FOR DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
BROWN AND EKLOF DECISIONs-Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987); EklofMarine Corp.
v. United States, 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985).
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter FTCA) en
acted in 1946,1 liability is generally imposed on the federal government
whenever the government negligently undertakes an activity. One
limit to broad government liability is the statutory exception for an act
which is discretionary in nature. 2 Historically, court decisions con
cerning the imposition of liability on the government have been ex
tremely inconsistent, 3 due primarily to the substantial difficulty the
courts have encountered interpreting the discretionary function excep
tion to the FTCA.4 Recently, this inconsistency has evidenced itself
in two decisions by the federal courts of appeals.
In the case of Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States,S the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the United States Coast
Guard was potentially liable to the owners of a vessel which ran
aground and was seriously damaged due to the Coast Guard's negli
gent placement of a navigational buoy.6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit was faced with a similar situation in the
case of Brown v. United States. 7 In that case, that court rejected the
reasoning of Eklof and held that an instrumentality of the United
States, the National Weather Service (hereinafter NWS), was not lia
ble for the death of several fishermen who drowned in a storm at sea. 8
The NWS had failed to predict the storm primarily because of a mal
functioning weather observation buoy.
Despite their apparent inconsistency, both the Eklof and Brown
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982). For the relevant text of this section see infra text accom
panying note 15.
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 18-61 and accompanying text.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). For the text of this section see infra text accOmpany
ing note 17.
5. 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. Id. at 205.
7. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987).

8. Id.
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decisions are in accord with precedence. The court in Eklof ruled that
when the federal government performs a discretionary act such as the
placement of a navigational buoy to aid vessels, it has a duty to use
reasonable care and will be held liable if this duty is breached. 9 The
Eklof decision is in agreement with a prior Supreme Court decision
that imposed liability on the Coast Guard.1O In contrast, the court in
Brown ruled that when the federal government performs a discretion
ary act, such as the preparation of a weather forecast for an area
which contains a malfunctioning weather observation buoy, it is pro
tected by immunity for any untoward consequences. I I The Brown de
cision is consistent with prior federal court decisions limiting
government liability for weather forecasting. 12
In an attempt to understand and explain these two conflicting in
terpretations of the discretionary function exception, Part I of this
note sets forth the background and substance of the FTCA and the
discretionary function exception. In this section the note focuses upon
the legislative history and congressional intent behind the Act and in
cludes an analysis of how the Supreme Court has applied the FTCA.
Part II describes the Brown and Eklof decisions including the facts
and issues the courts dealt with, the discretionary activities in ques
tion, and the reasoning employed to reach their respective conclusions.
Part III discusses the similarities and differences between the two
cases as well as the express and silent concerns of the courts. It identi
fies and analyzes the reasons why the courts reached diametrically op
posite conclusions. Part IV suggests that the solution to the prospect
of future judicial inconsistency in this area is further legislative clarifi
cation from Congress.
I.

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION

Congress passed the FTCA after nearly thirty years of debate. 13
The Act was the result of a congressional decision to allow private
citizens easy access to the federal courts for tort claims arising out of
9. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 200.
10. United States v. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 61 (1955). For a discussion of
Indian Towing, see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
11. Brown, 790 F.2d at 199.
12. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
13. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, and specifically Title IV-The Tort
Claims Act, see Ford, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 32 A.B.A. J. 741, 744,
808 (1946). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (discussion of the
background of the Tort Claims Act).

1987]

FORECASTS FOR DISCRETION

363

the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal government
employees. 14
The FfCA, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b), reads in part:
[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ...
for injury or loss of property, or personal ~njury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred. IS

The Act grants jurisdiction to the federal courts primarily for claims
arising out of common law torts committed by government employees.
The application of common law standards is evidenced by the lan
guage, "if a private person would be liable," and by the requirement
that the government must act in the same manner that a private indi
vidual would in order to avoid liability. The Act also allows claims
against the government to be litigated in federal courts instead of being
pursued through private bills, which proved to be notoriously
ineffective. 16
Congress recognized, however, that strong government depended
on the ability of government agencies to act freely, exercising discre
tion without fear of liability. It was this concern which led to the
14. Dalehite, 346 u.s. at 25. Prior to the passage of the FICA, petitioners had to
employ a private bill action against the United States. This system was very ineffective. For
example, in the Seventieth Congress, 2268 private claim bills were put before Congress.
Out of these only 336 were enacted of which 144 were for tort claims. Id. at 25 n.9. The
attempt to arrive at legislation to correct this problem can be traced as far back as 1855. In
that year, Congress first established the Court of Claims where the government consented
to suits based on contract claims and federal law claims brought by private citizens. In
1887, Congress expanded this amenability to suit to include all actions not sounding in tort,
while beginning in 1920 the government allowed suits for the first time on admiralty claims
and maritime claims involving United States vessels. Id. at 25 n.lO. In commenting on the
origins of the FICA, the Supreme Court has stated that the FICA came about as a result
of "inadequa[te] ... congressional machinery for [the] determination of facts, the importu
nities to which [the] claimants subjected members of Congress, and the capricious results
... [of the private bills]." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950). These concerns
led to a strong demand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to adjudication. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
16. See supra note 14. A further indication that Congress intended the government
to be treated as a private person would be in a tort claim is evidenced in 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1982). That statute reads: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages." Id.
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enactment of the discretionary function exception, which reads as
follows:
[S]ection 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- ... (a) Any claim
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a dis
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in
volved be abused. 17

By fashioning an exception for discretionary functions, Congress took
steps to protect the government from liability that would seriously
handicap efficient government operations. 18 The impact of the discre
tionary function exception is that the government cannot be held liable
for damages arising out of ministerial or administrative decisions. 19
For example, the decision by the government to purchase a certain
type of vehicle would be unreviewable, but negligence by a govern
ment employee in the operation of that vehicle would subject the gov
ernment to liability just as a private individual would be liable in this
circumstance. The problem, though, is that Congress did not define or
otherwise explain what is meant by the phrase "discretionary func
tion," thereby leaving it for the courts to construe.
A.

The Scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act

Over the years, the courts have attempted to interpret the Act
and formulate standards which may be applicable for imposing liabil
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). The other exceptions contained in § 2680 include:
b) claims based on transmission of letters or postal matters; c) claims with respect to cus
tom taxes or retention of goods by customs officers; d) claims based on admiralty jurisdic
tion; e) claims arising out of the administration of title 50; f) damages incurred or caused
by the imposition of a quarantine by the United States; g) repealed; h) claims based on
assault, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with con
tract relations; i) damages caused by the Treasury's fiscal regulations; j) claims based on
combatant activity during wartime; k) claims arising in a foreign country; I) claims arising
from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority; m) claims arising from the Panama
Canal Company; and n) activities and claims due to the activities of the federal land bank,
intermediate credit bank, or bank for cooperatives. [d.
18. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (federal prisoner can sue under
FICA to recover for personal injuries sustained in a federal prison due to the negligence of
a federal employee). See a/so United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984). In
Varig, the Supreme Court said that the discretionary function exception marks the bound
ary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and a
desire to protect certain government actions from exposure to suit by private individuals.
For further discussion of Varig, see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
19. Dalehite v. United States, 345 U.S. 15,26 (1953); see a/so note 17.
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ity on the government. In Feres v. United States,20 the Supreme Court
developed a doctrine which prohibited military personnel from assert
ing claims against the government when those claims are incident to
service. In Feres, a member of the armed forces was killed in a fire
resulting from government negligence and his estate was denied recov
ery.21 The primary concern in Feres was that sUbjecting the federal
government to liability under the FTCA would produce inconsistent
results because the laws of the states vary and the Act requires that the
law of the state where the tort occurred controls.22 According to the
doctrine set forth in Feres, because of the distinctly federal relationship
between a member of the service and the government, the only time a
member of the armed forces can recover is when the resulting injury is
not incident to the service of the member. For example, if a service
member were on leave he or she would be entitled to recover from the
government for negligent harm because the relationship between the
parties at this point would not be distinctly federal in nature. 23 Justice
20. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
21. Id. The case was actually a combination of three separate claims brought against
the government by federal employees claiming negligence on the part of the government.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought under the
FICA. The decedent perished in a fire in the barrack where he was living. The complaint
alleged that the government had reason to believe the barrack was a fire hazard. Id. at 137.
In affirming the decision to disallow the claim, Justice Jackson stated: "We know of no
American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either
his superior officers or the Government he is serving." Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). The
court reasoned that to permit recovery would subvert military discipline by varying the
rights of armed forces personnel according to the varied laws of the states as is required
under the FICA. Id. at 149. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
22. For the relevant text of the FICA, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950). See Shearer v. United States,
723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Feres doctrine does not apply where the
service member was on active leave and thus the injury was not incident to service), rev'd,
473 U.S. 52 (1985) (recovery under the Act is barred under Feres doctrine). See also
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, Chief Justice Burger wrote
for the majority and stated:
From ... legislative and judicial materials, however, it is possible to isolate sev
eral factors useful in determining when the acts of a Government employee are
protected .... First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor [that is, controlling rank is irrelevant].... Second, [it was intended that the]
exception . . . encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its
role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals.
Id. at 813-14 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Anderson v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mo. 1983), the court
upheld the doctrine where a member of the United States Navy brought a claim under the
FICA when he was injured because of a fire on a Navy ship. The court stated that "Feres
requires ... that there be some proximate relationship between the service member's activi
ties and the Armed Forces." Id. at 472. In Anderson, that relationship existed and the
court denied recovery. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Liability a/the Government
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Jackson, writing for the majority in Feres, provided a synopsis of the
congressional intent behind the FTCA: "The primary purpose of the
Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without. ... [The]
effect [of the Act] is to waive immunity from recognized causes of ac
tion ... [but] not to visit the Government with novel and unprece
dented liabilities."24 Feres acted as a strict ban on recovery for
military personnel which, until recently, courts have applied rigidly
with few exceptions.
In the case of West v. United States,25 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit allowed recovery to a third party whose claim was
based upon a separate but related action of the service member's.26
In West, the parents of a daughter who suffered birth defects and ulti
mate death brought an action in her right because of the negligent
mistyping of her father's bloodtype. 27 The Seventh Circuit found that
although the negligence was incident to the father's service, the FTCA
did not bar recovery and the Feres doctrine was inapplicable. 28 The
court found the Feres requirement that the relationship between the
parties be distinctly federal was lacking. The daughter was ineligible
for any other government benefits or allowances; furthermore, the
concern in Feres of subverting military discipline by allowing recovery
to Servicemen/or Injuries Incident to Service, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1022 (1951) (arguing that
the distinction drawn between injuries incident to service is absurd and unfair to service
men and concluding that whatever inconvenience may be placed on the government for
liability from injuries incident to service is far outweighed by a policy of decreasing govern
mental immunity).
24. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140-41. Justice Jackson also noted that:
[the] FfCA was not an isolated and spontaneous flash of Congressional generos
ity. It mark[ed] the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences
of sovereign immunity from suit. While the political theory that the King could
do no wrong was repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the
Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented . . .. [This doc
trine] was invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied ... as vigorously as it
had been on behalf of the Crown. As the Federal Government expanded its activ
ities, its agents caused a multiplying number of remediless wrongs-wrongs
which would have been actionable if inflicted by an individual or a corporation
but remediless solely because their perpetrator was an officer or employee of the
Government.
/d. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted).
25. 729 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
26. Id. at 1121.
27. The mother's and father's bloodtypes were in fact incompatible. Id.
28. Id. at 1123-24. See also In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506
F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the Feres doctrine did not bar the non-deriva
tive claims of the wives and children of servicemembers who were exposed to agent orange
while serving in Viet Nam), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1067 (1981), modified, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal denied,
745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
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was noticeably absent, because bloodtyping is not distinctly military in
nature. 29
Several years after Feres, Dalehite v. United States 30 provided an
informative discussion of the legislative background of the FICA and
the discretionary function exception. In Dalehite, the plaintiffs
brought an action against the Tennessee Valley Authority to recover
damages for deaths caused by an explosion of Fertilizer Grade Ammo
nium Nitrate produced and controlled by the federal government in
Texas City, Texas. 31 The Supreme Court held that the activity in ques
tion fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA and
hence the government was immune from liability.32 Justice Reed,
writing for the majority, said the FTCA was the "offspring of a feeling
that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for
the misfeasance of [its] employees in carrying out its work."33 How
ever, Justice Reed added, "it was not contemplated that the Govern
ment should be subject[ed] to liability arising from acts of a
governmental nature or function."34
29. West, 729 F.2d at 1124-26. For a detailed discussion and criticism of Feres, see
Note, The Cancer Spreads: Atomic Veterans Powerless in the Aftermath of Feres v. United
States, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (1984) (arguing that the refusal of the government to
compensate veterans exposed to radiation in the 1950s leaves the veterans and their families
to bear the full cost of the injury). See also Comment, An Interpretation of the Feres Doc
trine After West v. United States and In re "Agent Orange" Product Litigation, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 737 (1985).
30. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
31. Id. at 17. Dalehite was a test case which represented 300 separate claims against
the government for a total of more than $200,000,000. Id. The explosion and resulting fire
which occurred was so tremendous that most of Texas City, Texas was levelled, and many
lives were lost. Id. at 23. The claim stated that the United States, without properly investi
gating the chemical fertilizer, "shipped the substance to a congested area without warning
of the possibility of an explosion under certain conditions." Id. The Supreme Court ruled
that the decision to institute the fertilizer export program was a discretionary act and the
combustibility of the fertilizer under conditions likely to be encountered in shipping was to
be determined by the discretion of those in charge of the production of the fertili.zer. Id. at
37-38. The policy of producing and storing the fertilizer was undertaken as a means to deal
with the government's obligation after World War II, as occupying power of Germany,
Japan, and Korea, to feed the popUlations of those countries. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 41-42.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). But see Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315, 318 (1957). In Rayonier, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States was not
immune from liability for the negligence of government firefighters (Forest Service) if under
similar circumstances a private person would be liable. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, disagreed with the result in Dalehite and stated:
It may be that it is "novel and unprecedented" to hold the United States account
able for the negligence of its firefighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims
Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from
tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability.
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The decision in Dalehite to undertake the chemical production,
storage, and transportation was made at the administrative leveps and
thus was within the character of actions specifically exempted from
liability under Section 2680(a) of the Act. 36 The Court defined the
scope of the discretionary function exception in clear language:
"[T]he discretionary function or duty that cannot form a basis for suit
under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of pro
grams and activities. It also includes determinations made by execu
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations."37 Thus, not only was the decision to pro
duce the fertilizer discretionary, but the actions taken to plan and
carry out the operation were discretionary and unreviewable. 38
Problems for the federal courts arise when they are faced with the
inevitable task of defining a discretionary act. The courts often strug
gle to categorize the negligent or wrongful acts as belonging to one of
two categories, administrative/planning or operational. This effort to
Id. at 319.
35. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 37.
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). See also Moffit v. United States,
430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In Moffit, the plaintiff claimed that she was sexually

assaulted by an employee of the United States Postal Service. She also claimed the assault
was a foreseeable consequence of the negligence of the postal service in hiring the employee
because he had a criminal record. Id. at 37. The court did not rule on the issue of whether
the hiring of the employee was discretionary. Id. at 38. It did say, however, that" 'the
exemption for discretionary functions seeks to insulate from judicial inquiry the propriety
of basic policy decisions made by officials ... [who have] broad and pervasive decision
making responsibility.''' Id. at 38 (quoting Downs v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 713, 747
(M.D. Tenn. 1974».
38. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15. Although the Supreme Court found the actions taken by
the government negligent but unreviewable, the Court weighed heavily the fact that the
government had been producing and controlling fertilizer with no difficulty for over three
years prior to the explosion. The Court found that since the government had experienced
consistent success with past operations, it had no reason to believe it was operating danger
ously. Id. at 38. The Court in Dalehite also had to deal with the issue of absolute liability.
The petitioners argued that the government should be liable regardless of the nature of its
conduct because the damages arose from a decision to engage in an inherently dangerous
activity. Id. at 44-45. Justice Reed agreed that the degree of care used in performance of
the activity is irrelevant when the issue is strict liability, however, the FTCA "requires a
negligent act ... [by an employee and it is the court's] judgment that liability does not arise
by virtue ... of United States ownership of ... or ... engaging in an 'extra-hazardous'
activity." Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 67 (1st. Cir. 1952». Justice
Jackson, writing for the dissent, advocated a stricter standard of due care to be placed upon
the government. His position was that if the government is going to undertake an activity,
it should be subject to the same standards of safety as a private individual or corporation.
Id. at 53 (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a descriptive analysis of the Dalehite decision, see
Mathews, Federal Tort Claims Act-The Proper Scope ofthe Discretionary Function Excep
tion, 6 AM. U.L. REV. 22 (1957).
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categorize usually results in an attempt to distinguish between a negli
gent implementation of a policy decision and a negligent policy judg
ment itself, without any clear guidelines. Traditionally, if the decision
is categorized as a negligent policy judgment, the decision is immune.
Congress drafted § 2680(a) as a clarifying amendment to assure
governmental protection from tort liability for errors in administrative
decisions. 39 The Supreme Court in Dalehite attempted to define the
scope of the FTCA by quoting the testimony before the House Judici
ary Committee of an Assistant Attorney General concerning the
meaning of § 2680(a):
[The purpose of the exception is to avoid] "any possibility that the
act may be construed to authorize damage suits against the Govern
ment growing out of a legally authorized activity," merely because
"the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious." It
was not "intended that the constitutionality of the legislation, the
legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary adminis
trative act, should be tested through the medium of a damage suit
for tort. "40

The Supreme Court in Dalehite viewed the FTCA as an historical
achievement by Congress. By enacting the FTCA, Congress had
manifested an intent to exclude the federal government from litigation
for claims regarding distinctly governmental functions, and yet the
government could be brought into court to answer for wrongs in some
instances.
Two years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court substantially broad
ened the application of the FTCA and the discretionary function ex
39. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26-27.
40. Id. at 27 (quoting Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and 6463 Before the
House Comm on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1942) (statement by Assistant
Attorney General Francis M. Shea». The House Report on the debate of the Act adopted
language very close to that of the Assistant Attorney General. The report stated:

[This paragraph, § 2680(a), characterized as] a highly important exception, in
tended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize [a]
suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized activity,
such as, a flood-control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of
any Government agent is' shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention
that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious .... The bill is
not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a
remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed
and involving an abuse of discretion.
Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judici
ary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942) (statement by Assistant Attorney General Francis M.
Shea), quoted in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 29.
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ception in United States v. Indian Towing Co. 41 In Indian Towing, the
United States Coast Guard was held liable for negligently maintaining
a lighthouse. 42 The light in the lighthouse had gone out, leaving navi
gators in the area in a perilous position. 43 The plaintiffs sued under
the FTCA, alleging negligence due to the failure of the Coast Guard to
check the battery and sun relay system, which operated the light
house. 44 In ruling that the discretionary function exception did not
exempt the government from liability in this instance, Justice Frank
furter stated: "The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse
service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate the light ... and
engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obli
gated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good
working order .... "45
The primary issue considered was whether there was negligence
at the administrative or operational level. The Supreme Court con
cluded that the malfunctioning light was negligence at the operational
level: thus, the government was held accountable. 46 In sum, under
the FTCA, the government could be held liable only for failing to
maintain a certain standard of care after the discretionary decision to
undertake the lighthouse had been made.
Recently, the Supreme Court returned to a narrow interpretation
of the FTCA in United States v. Varig Airlines. 47 In that case, Varig
41. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id. at 63. For an argument that Indian Towing is explainable by the fact that
operating a lighthouse is not a uniquely governmental function, see Case Comment, The
Federal Claims Act After Indian Towing, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 312 (1955). But see United
States v. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 61, 70 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) (the establish
ment of a lighthouse is a uniquely governmental function under 14 U.S.C. § 83).
45. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69. Justice Reed, writing for the dissent, argued for a
narrow interpretation of the FTCA, which he believed should not be read with "extrava
gant generosity so as to make the Government liable in instances where no liability was
intended by Congress." Id. at 75 (Reed, J., dissenting). He further argued that if Congress
intended to create liability for all incidents, that intention should be made plain. Id. Thus,
the cautious application of the FTCA in Feres and Dalehite was advocated as the solution
to the problem in Indian Towing.
46. Id. at 63. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, ON TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
In this text the principle is derived that if the alleged negligent conduct is at the planning
level it is protected by immunity, but once a decision is taken at the planning level it is not
immune and must be carried out with reasonable care.
47. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, a fire started in one of the lavatories on board a
Boeing 747 owned by Varig. The fire caused the death of a majority of the passengers and
the jet was destroyed. [d. at 800. The FAA had decided'to implement a program under
which it was left to the manufacturers of the jets to comply with government safety regula
tions. Id. at 805. The federal employees involved decided that the best way to enforce
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Airlines brought an action against the United States under the FfCA,
seeking damages for the deaths of passengers and for the destruction
of a jet. The plaintiffs claimed that the Federal Aviation Administra
tion (FAA) had been negligent by only "spot checking" and not fully
inspecting the jet. The Supreme Court, relying heavily on Dalehite
ruled that the actions taken by the (FAA) were discretionary:
As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define
with precision every contour of the discretionary function excep
tion. . . . In administering the "spot check" program, these FAA
engineers and inspectors [encountered certain] risks, but those risks
were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose
and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in the regulations
and operating manuals. Under such circumstances, the FAA's al
leged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the
course of certificating a particular aircraft falls squarely within the
these standards in light of limited resources was to perform "spot checks." Id. at 817.
Chief Justice Burger stated that, although negligent, the actions taken by the FAA fell
within the discretionary function exception:
[T]he acts of the FAA employees in executing the "spot-check" program in ac
cordance with agency directives are protected by the discretionary function ex
ception. . . . The FAA employees who conducted ... [the inspections] were
specifically empowered to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confi
dence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maxi
mize compliance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency
resources.
Id. at 820 (citation omitted).
Both Varig and Indian Towing dealt with negligent inspections on behalf of the gov
ernment. However, the distinguishing element between the cases is that the Court in Varig
was primarily concerned with an allegedly negligent policy decision regarding inspection,
while in Indian Towing the alleged negligence was the failure of the Coast Guard to inspect
and maintain the lighthouse.
Varig only held that the spot checking policy was discretionary. It did not categori
cally hold that under all circumstances the negligent checking of an airplane would be
inactionable. In other words, the government could not be held liable on the policy judg
ment made at the administrative level for the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Burger, but
the government conceivably could, under the Indian Towing rationale, be held liable for the
inspection at the operational level if some causal link between a negligent inspection and
the resulting crash could be established.
State courts do not necessarily apply the same standards as the federal courts do when
establishing liability for negligent inspections by state agencies. In fact, liability is often
imposed for negligent inspections. For example, in Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen &
Bergendoff, 234 Kan. 289, 672 P.2d 1083 (1983), a truck driver was killed after his truck
encountered a four foot by five foot-six inch hole in a bridge caused by deck deterioration.
Id. at 290, 672 P.2d at 108. The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that highway inspectors
contracted by the State Transportation Department had a legal duty to the public to exer
cise reasonable care when inspecting the bridge. Id. at 292, 672 P.2d at 1084. Liability was
imposed because the contractors had made only a visual inspection of a bridge and failed to
recommend repairs for a bridge which was in obvious need of an overhaul.
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discretionary function exception of § 2680(a).48

Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, also expressed the
view that courts should be reluctant to venture into an area where they
have neither the expertise nor authority to determine what was or was
not a good decision. "Judicial intervention ... through private tort
suits would require the government to 'second guess' the political, so
cial and economic judgment of an agency exercising its regulatory
function. "49
Therefore, the Court found the decision by the FAA to spot
check and to place the duty of complying with the safety standards
upon the manufacturers to be discretionary and unreviewable. so It is
apparent that the Court was aware of the limited funds which Con
gress allocates to government agencies and the pressures inherent in
allocating funds in a proper fashion. Because so much debate and con
troversy surrounds the system of allocation, the Court distanced itself
from what is appropriately a legislative function. The decision by the
Supreme Court in Varig Airlines reversed a lower court trend of set
ting strict limitations upon the discretionary function exception. 5 1
The Court maintained that the FAA has a duty to promote aviation
safety but not to insure it. 52
Federal courts of appeals have applied extensively the discretion
ary function exception standards set forth in Dalehite. In Nevin v.
United States 53 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the government's choice to use a particular strain of bacterium in a
simulated attack on the City of San Francisco in 1950 was made at the
planning level and thus was exempt from liability under the discretion
48. Varig, 467 U.S. at 813, 820.
49. Id. at 820. For a further discussion of Varig Airlines, see Comment, United
States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W.L. REV. 175 (1985)
(arguing that the Supreme Court failed to seize a golden opportunity to define the scope of
the discretionary function exception).
50. Varig, 467 U.S. at 820. Accord Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283 (1st Cir.
1985). The First Circuit found the government not liable for failing to promulgate a policy
regarding a duty to warn government contractors about the hazards of asbestos. Conclud
ing that the omission fell within the discretionary function exception, the court applied the
Dalehite and Varig decisions and concluded: "The government's omission of a policy re
quiring the Federal Department of Labor, or others acting under its authority, to warn the
endangered workers themselves of a work hazard was a discretionary ... function excep
tion to the FTCA." Id. at 290.
51. See, e.g., De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding that the government cannot resort to the discretionary function excep
tion for admiralty claims).
52. Varig, 467 U.S. at 821.
53. 696 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ary function exception to the FfCA.54 In reaching this conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit relied on Dalehite and reaffirmed that the purpose of
the discretionary function exception was to permit the government to
be free from liability for negligence associated with planning level deci
sions. 55 Echoing earlier concerns expressed by the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit showed a reluctance to have the courts evaluate the ac
tivity in question because it would "impair the effective administration
of the government."56
Despite the broad interpretation of the discretionary function ex
ception in Nevin, the Ninth Circuit in another instance has narrowed
its application. 57 In Lindgren v. United States,58 a water skier brought
an action against the United States for damages sustained when the
skier struck the bottom of the Colorado River below Parker's Dam,
which was operated by the government. 59 The claim alleged that the
Bureau of Reclamation knew that the area was used for recreation but
failed to warn users of the fluctuations in water level caused by the
dam. 6O In applying the discretionary function exception, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that although government operation of a dam tradition
ally is considered to fall within the discretionary function exception,
the government may have a duty to warn of a danger if the exercise of
the discretion creates that danger. 61 In this instance the operation of
the dam created the danger and therefore the government had a duty
to warn of the potential hazard.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1230. See a/so Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that FAA traffic controllers were not liable for failing to sight birds which were
later ingested by a plane's engine and resulted in the crash of that plane and death of the
pilot. The court ruled that no duty existed on the part of the controllers and, even if a duty
did exist, the failure to sight the birds fell within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA).
56. Nevin, 696 F.2d at 1230.
57. See United States v. Yarig Airlines, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467
U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the government is barred form
resorting to the discretionary function exception when failing to comply with certain FAA
standards and that the negligent inspection of the jet was similar to the negligence in Indian
Towing. Id. at 1209.
58. 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 979.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 980-82. The court cited cases which held government failure to warn of
hazards actionable: Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
decision not to warn visitors of hazards in undeveloped areas of Yellowstone Park must be
judged separately from the discretionary function exception); United States v. Washington,
351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that the failure of the government to warn aviators of
unmarked electric power lines was actionable).
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Limits On The Scope Of The Federal Tort Claims Act As
Applied To Admiralty Actions

Congress has legislated that there are certain activities to which
the discretionary function exception does not apply.62 In such cases,
the remedy against the government for liability arising out of that ac
tivity must be sought under the specific statute governing that activity.
Admiralty actions provide one such example. The FTCA specifically
provides in § 2680(d) that "provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- ... (d) Any claim for which a
remedy is ... provided [under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA)]
relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States."63
General confusion over the scope of the discretionary function
exception is compounded in the case of admiralty actions. Congress
exempted suits under the SIAA from the limitation on liability in the
discretionary function exception based upon a consensus among legis
lators that the liability of the government should be coextensive with
that of private shipowners and shippers because the government was a
primary participant in merchant shipping. 64
The relationship between § 2680(d) and the SIAA has been inter
preted in various ways. On the one hand, some courts have read
§ 2680(d) to mean that the discretionary function exception does not
62. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
63. 46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982) provides in part:
In cases where ... such vessel were privately owned ... or possessed, or if a
private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be
maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought
against the United States or against such corporation [mentioned in section 741 of
this title]. Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for
the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their
principal place of business....
Id.
Enacted in 1920, the statute barred any proceeding in rem against a vessel or cargo
owned by the United States. See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT,
724-30 (3d ed. 1979).
64. De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1977).
In De Bardeleben, plaintiffs brought an action against the United States under the SIAA for
damage resulting when an anchor on a barge ruptured a natural gas pipeline. Id. In pro
claiming that the discretionary function exception is not included in the SIAA, the court
said "[t]he words of the statute, its legislative history, the liberal approach in interpreting
waivers of immunity, and the senseless absurdities which would result belie the narrow
reading that the Government ... givers] to the [SIAA]." Id. at 145. See also G. GILMORE
& c. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 982-83 (1975). The authors state that this
concern was due to the increased participation of the United States in the shipping busi
ness. The waiver of sovereign immunity in the SIAA was in order to subject the United
States to the same liability as a private individual. Id.
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apply to the SIAA.65 These courts have reasoned that if Congress had
intended to include the SIAA within the discretionary function excep
tion, it would have done so explicitly.66 On the other hand, some
courts have been willing to apply the discretionary function exception
to a claim brought under the SIAA. These courts have reasoned that
by enacting the FICA and the discretionary function exception, Con
gress intended that the government would not be held accountable for
discretionary actions leading to claims brought under the SIAA.67

II.

THE EKLOF AND BROWN DECISIONS

The confusion over the scope of the discretionary function excep
tion in the context of suits in admiralty was brought to the fore in the
recent cases of Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States 68 and Brown v.
United States. 69 In Eklof, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
the discretionary function exception inapplicable and held the Coast
Guard liable for inadequately marking a reef.70 In Brown, the First
65. See infra notes 66-67.
66. Hillier v. Southern Towing Co., 714 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1983). In Hillier a
"coast-guardsman" was sent to monitor the discharge of ammonia from a barge. He died
on the barge from inhaling ammonia fumes. His widow sued the United States under the
SIAA, alleging that the Coast Guard was negligent in failing to train the decedent and to
provide him with adequate equipment. Id. at 717. The court stated that "[t]here is no
evidence that by amending the ... [SIAA] Congress authorized the courts to subject the
United States to novel and far-reaching judge-made liabilities ...." Id. at 722.
67. See Coastwise Packet Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968); Beeler V. United States, 256 F. Supp. 771 (W.O. Pa. 1966).
See also M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 3D (Supp. 1987),
which states:
The question of whether the discretionary function exception should be implied in
the SIAA ... has ... produc[ed] a conflict between ... [the circuits]. The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits ... refuse[] to imply ... [an] exception, arguing that Congress
should cure the statute if the waiver of sovereign immunity is too extensive. The
First Circuit has adopted the opposite position and has implied ... [the] discre
tionary function exception.
Id. at § 150 (quoting Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1980».
The disagreement among the courts developed as a result of the congressional amend
ment to the SIAA in 1960. Congress amended the SIAA to read, "or if a private person or
property were involved" and deleted the words "vessel or cargo owned by the United
States." 46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982). The effect of the amendment was that a petitioner was no
longer limited to bringing an action in admiralty against the government which pertained
solely to a government owned vessel or cargo. In essence, the amendment allowed suits in
admiralty to be brought against the government if the claim could be brought against a
private citizen. Thus, there were many more claims in admiralty brought against the
United States as a result of this.
68. 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987).
70. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
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Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of Eklof, applied the
discretionary function exception, and found the government not liable
for the failure to repair a buoy used as a source of weather
information. 71
A.

Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States

On June 14, 1983, the M/V Reliable was travelling north on the
Hudson River toward its destination of Albany, New York. The Reli
able ran aground at Diamond Reef, the site of previous groundings. 72
The Coast Guard, acting under its charter, 14 U.S.C. § 2,73 had
marked the southern end of the reef with one navigational buoy. The
crew of the Reliable relied upon the buoy when they passed through
Diamond Reef. Due to the grounding, the Reliable suffered tremen
dous damage. 74
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower
court decision and found for the plaintiffs. 75 The court held that the
Coast Guard had in fact been negligent, and reasoned that since the
Coast Guard had decided to act, it must act reasonably or suffer the
consequences of liability for negligence. 76 The court concluded that
once the Coast Guard had acted in a way that allowed navigators to
rely on its action, it could be held liable for not measuring up to a
proper standard of care. "It is reliance that gives rise to the Coast
Guard's duty."77
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir
71. Brown, 790 F.2d at 203.
72. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 201.
73. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) describes the primary duties of the Coast Guard:
a) enforcement and assistance in the enforcement of federal laws on the high seas;
b) administration, promulgation, and enforcement of regulations for the promotion of
safety on the high seas; c) development, establishment, maintenance and operation of aids
to navigation, icebreaking facilities and rescue missions; d) engaging in oceanographic re
search; and e) maintenance of a state of readiness to function in the Navy during times of
war. Id. See also 14 U.S.c. § 81 (1982). Section 81 sets forth the general description of the
Coast Guard's duties with respect to navigational markings for the military. It provides:
"In order to aid navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and wrecks of vessels and
aircraft, the Coast Guard may establish, maintain, and operate: ... aids to maritime navi
gation ...." Id.
74. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 200. The plaintiff's claim was for a total of $382,000.
75. Id. at 201. The lower court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12b(6).
76. Id. at 202. The court said that where the Coast Guard has acted to mark an
obstruction or maritime danger, a duty arises to do so in a way that does not create a new
hazard.
77. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 202-03. Reliance is a standard maxim of tort law.
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cuit relied primarily on United States v. Indian Towing CO.78 The
court in Eklof drew an analogy between the facts before it and Indian
Towing. The Second Circuit recognized that under Indian Towing
there was in fact no statutory duty of the Coast Guard to undertake
the marking of the reef. However, the court concluded that although
the "instant case does not present the situation of a malfunctioning
lighthouse, ... the duty of the Coast Guard ... [was] essentially the
same: once the Coast Guard acts, and causes others justifiably to rely
on such action, a duty arises to act . . . with due care . . . ."79 The
Eklof court reasoned that once the Coast Guard had made the discre
tionary decision to mark the reef, it was obligated to ensure that it was
marked correctly and safely. A common element in both Eklof and
Indian Towing was that the negligence by the government occurred at
the operational level as opposed to the administrative level.
The Second Circuit contended its decision was consistent with the
Fourth Circuit opinion in Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States. 80 In
Somerset, the Court of Appeals found the Coast Guard liable for neg
ligence in maintaining a navigational buoy over 500 feet from the posi
tion of a sunken wreck. 81 The court in Eklof adopted the reasoning in
Somerset, and concluded that even if the decision to mark or remove
the wreck be regarded as discretionary there should be liability for
negligence in marking the buoy at Diamond Reef, even after the dis
cretion has been exercised and the decision to mark the reef was
made. 82
While approving the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Somerset, the court refused to follow the First Circuit's opinion in
Chute v. United States. 83 In Chute, the Coast Guard's decision to
78. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
79. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203.
80. 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
81. Id. at 640. In Somerset, shipowners brought suit under the FICA against the
government for damages arising from the sinking of the plaintiff's ship due to the negligent
marking of a wreck by the United States. Id. at 633. The Fourth Circuit, finding the
government liable, ruled that even if the decision to mark or remove the wreck were re
garded as discretionary, there was liability for negligence in marking after the discretion
had been exercised and the decision to mark had been made. Id. at 635. The court further
stated that the proper location of a buoy depended upon "many factors, including ... the
width of the channel, ... the depth of the water, ... the volume of vessel traffic, and the
probable effect of ice or storms on the buoy." Id. at 637. See also United States v. Travis,
165 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1947) (holding the government liable for placing a buoy 350 feet
away from a wreck); United States v. Bickel, 46 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1931) (government was
held liable when the buoy was placed only 200 feet away from the wreck).
82. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203.
83. 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979). In that case, an abandoned United States Navy vessel
was being used as a bombing target by the Navy. The Coast Guard placed a buoy, three
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mark a submerged navy wreck was held unreviewable. The First Cir
cuit expressed the position that if the discretionary function is to re
main meaningful, the choice as to when and how to mark the danger
must in all cases be final. 84
The court in Eklof disagreed with three concerns expressed by the
Chute court. First, the Eklof court took issue with the First Circuit's
fear that the jury would be unable to determine whether the Coast
Guard breached its duty of care. To this concern the Second Circuit
responded, "We commit for decision to courts and juries many issues
of equal or greater complexity and importance than the than the ques
tion of whether a marine obstruction was properly marked."85 Sec
ond, the court in Chute held that imposing liability on the Coast
Guard in this situation would force the Coast Guard to choose the
most effective and best means of marking an obstruction, thus placing
an unfair burden upon the Coast Guard and setting a dangerous prece
dent. 86 The Second Circuit in Eklof said the answer to this concern
was that the method chosen must be proven only to be reasonable
under the circumstances and not the "best" available. 87 Lastly, the
Second Circuit disagreed with the First Circuit's position that courts
have "neither the expertise, the information, nor the authority to allo
cate ... finite resources ... among competing priorities."88 The Sec
ond Circuit responded to this concern by asserting that the standard of
review is what is reasonable under the circumstances:
Every case must be judged on its particular facts, and liability must
be determined, once a duty has been found to exist, by reference to
the surrounding circumstances and the knowledge, or lack thereof,
on the part of the alleged tortfeasor. In short, while reliance defines
the duty, reasonableness defines its breach. 89

and one half feet tall, to mark the site of the vessel. Plaintiff's boat ran into the marker and
two passengers were severely injured. Id. at 9. In Chute, the claim was brought under 14
U.S.C. § 86 (1982) which reads: "The Secretary ... may mark for the protection ... of any
sunken vessel or other obstruction existing on any navigable waters of the United States in
such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of maritime navigation require."
Id.
84. Chute, 610 F.2d at 12.
85. Eklof, 752 F.2d at 204.
86. Chute, 610 F.2d at 13.
87. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
88. Chute, 610 F.2d at 12.
89. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
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Brown v. United States

In Brown v. United States,90 the plaintiffs, representatives of sev
eral deceased fishermen, brought a claim in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts under the SIAA. The claim
alleged that the federal government was negligent for failing to repair
or replace a malfunctioning weather observation buoy. The lower
court found the National Weather Service liable for the death of the
fishermen because it had failed (primarily due to the defective buoy) to
predict a storm, which led to the death of the fishermen. 91
The National Weather Service formulates its predictions mainly
from information received by the National Meteorological Center
(NMC) in Washington, D.C.92 The NMC acquires the bulk of its in
formation from weather observation buoys which transmit the infor
mation gathered via satellite to the NMC. This information is then
sent to the regional NWS offices which use the information to prepare
forecasts.93 The problem in Brown originated with the malfunctioning
weather observation buoy 6N12, located at the Georges Bank buoy
station, which apparently had been damaged by a passing ship. On
September 9, 1980, the government discovered that the buoy was send
ing faulty wind speed and direction information. 94 The NMC contin
ued to log the data from 6N12 but ceased sending it to the NWS. The
United States Government Data Buoy Center (NDBC) had made two
unsuccessful attempts to replace 6N12 and had made no repairs to it.95
At noon on November 21, 1980, the fishermen of the boats FlY
Fairwind and FlY Sea Fever left the port of Hyannis, Massachusetts
to engage in lobster fishing. Prior to leaving, the crew, in accordance
with custom, listened to the 11:00 AM weather forecast which pre
dicted good weather. Early the next day, the boats arrived at the fish
ing spot and the weather turned severe. 96 The reports that the NWS
90. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987).
91. Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877, 877 (D. Mass. 1984).
92. Id. Congress established the duties of the NWS in 15 U.S.C. § 313 (1982). That
section reads: "The Secretary of Commerce shall have charge of the forecasting of weather
... and flood signals for the benefit of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, ... [and] the
distribution of meteorological information ... as may be necessary to establish and record
climate conditions of the United States ...." Id.
93. Brown, 790 F.2d at 201.
94. Id. at 200. The wind sensor on the buoy was malfunctioning, a condition known
as "spiking."
95. Id. at 202. The NDBC had on two separate occasions lost buoys which were
destined to replace 6N12. The plaintiffs argued that the failure of the government to replace
or repair 6N12, because the buoy was scheduled to be replaced the following January, was
a breach of a duty of due care. Brown, 599 F. Supp. at 887.
96. Brown, 790 F.2d at 200.
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had furnished were in error and by the time the reports accurately
reflected the current weather it was too late to return to the harbor.
The Fairwind sank in the violent storm and three of its crew were
lost.97
Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the lower court decision and found the government not liable
for the negligent forecast.98 The court in Brown dismissed the Eklof
reasoning, stating: "[t]he [Ekloj] court has read the discretionary
function exception right out by finding it does not apply at precisely
the place to which it is particularly directed."99
The Brown court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the govern
ment's failure to repair or replace the buoy was negligent. The govern
ment argued that it had no actionable duty and, even if it did, it had
acted reasonably under the circumstances. loo The First Circuit ap
plied Indian Towing 101 and the rationale behind Chute 102 to reverse
the lower court. The court defined the issue to be "whether the gov
ernment, by issuing reports, assumed a duty to invest in that activity
whatever resources a court might find necessary in order to achieve
what ... [the government] believed to be proper care."103 Thus, the
court relied on a different aspect of Indian Towing, finding that there
were two principles involved in determining liability: "[T]he govern
ment's free right to engage, or not, in discretionary functions, but with
a cut-off where by [sic] its conduct, ... has induced justified reliance
on its adequate performance."I04
In explaining these two principles, the court relied on the Chute
interpretation of Indian Towing. lOS The court in Chute said,
"[l]iability was not imposed in . . . [Indian Towing] because a more
97. Id. The plaintiffs in Brown produced an expert witness who testified that if the
correct reports had been coming from the buoy, the NWS would have been able to forecast
the storm in time for the boats to return to port safely. The government countered this
argument by stating that 6N12 was not malfunctioning at the time the storm developed
and, therefore, the expert witness' testimony should not be given any weight. Further, the
government argued that it was not using 6N12 at that time, and that it had no "actionable
duty" toward the plaintiffs. Id. at 200-01.
98. Id. at 204.
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. at 200. But see Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984).
The lower court held the government liable for the forecast by applying traditional tort
standards of duty, breach, causation and damage. Id. at 884-88.
101. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. 61.
102. Chute, 610 F.2d 7.
103. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202.
104. Id. at 201.
105. Id. For a further discussion of the Chute court's interpretation of Indian Tow
ing, see M. NORRIS, supra note 67, at § 151.
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powerful light or taller lighthouse would have been a better warning of
the rocks marked by the lighthouse, but rather because the negligent
non-functioning of the ... [advertised] lighthouse misled plaintiff to
his detriment."106 The First Circuit observed that "[t]he rationale of
Chute was that although the Coast Guard is known to have under
taken marking dangers to navigation, the extent to which it will do so
is a discretionary function. There can be no justified reliance upon, or
expectation of, any particular degree of performance; something more
is needed to establish liability."107 The First Circuit in Brown reiter
ated its earlier concern in Chute that courts have neither the expertise
nor authority to allocate finite resources. 108
Perhaps the most important language in Brown is its sharp criti
cism of the Eklof decision. The court held that the Second Circuit had
misunderstood the teaching of Indian Towing by failing to recognize
"the pernicious consequences that could flow from its approach."109
For example, Coast Guard officials with necessarily limited funds, un
able to afford three buoys, may decide to place no aids to navigation
rather than risk the consequences which may arise if they mark the
danger inadequately.l1o These cases demonstrate that the role courts
should play in the allocation of government resources has developed
into a major area of disagreement between the First and Second
Circuits.

III.

THE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS AND THE
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The extensive analysis and discussion in Brown and Eklof dem
onstrates that the respective courts have reached carefully reasoned
decisions. Yet, the similarity of facts and issues in these cases inevita
bly gives rise to speculation about the different judicial treatment they
have received.
On the one hand, the Eklof court ruled that once the Coast
Guard acted, that action induced or engendered reliance which led to
the grounding of the Reliable. Based on this logic, the court ruled that
the action undertaken at the outset of the marking of the reef must be
performed with a reasonable duty of care. The court found that the
initial decision to mark the reef was an administrative decision and
106.

Id.
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
107.

at
at
at
at

201 (quoting Chute, 610 F.2d at 13-14).
201-02.
202.
202 n.S.
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unreviewable. In consequence, if the Coast Guard had chosen not to
mark the reef, it could not be held liable. III
In Eklof, the court found that the positioning of the buoy or the
inadequacy of marking the site with a single buoy were the primary
reasons for the grounding of the Reliable.ll2 The court rejected the
government's contention that the position of the buoy was a planning
rather than an operational function.
The decision, however, to place a navigational aid at a particular
location or to employ only one such aid at that location, as opposed
to the initial decision to mark the obstruction, is not an expression
of any "policy" of which we are aware and does not constitute an
executive branch decision .... 113

Based upon this reasoning, the court found the marking of the reef to
be reviewable.
On the other hand, the First Circuit in Brown decided that the
decision to continue to develop forecasts for the area where the fisher
men met their demise without the aid of 6N12 was discretionary and,
therefore, unreviewable. I 14 Thus, the discretionary decision to under
take the job of weather forecasting was unreviewable. In Brown, it was
established that the malfunctioning buoy, although allegedly not being
used at the time, led to the inaccurate forecast. If the buoy had not
been spiking, the NWS undoubtedly would have used the accurate in
formation to calculate a more reliable forecast.
In sum, the courts were faced with two situations involving gov
ernment positioned and employed buoys. There is little, if any, con
ceptual difference between a mispositioned buoy and a malfunctioning
buoy; both foreseeably will cause damage. Significantly, in both in
stances the government was aware of the problems the buoys were
creating. In Eklof, other navigators apparently had relied on the buoy
to their detriment. llS Yet the Coast Guard took no affirmative meas
ures to secure the area to prevent further damage to passing ships.116
In Brown, the NWS was aware of the spiking condition of 6N12 and
the NDBC had attempted unsuccessfully to repair and replace 6N12.
However, it continued to issue weather reports for the area despite
Ill. Id. See also Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1980) (the
Coast Guard was held not liable for electing not to erect a light in Chicago Harbor as a
navigational aid), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
112. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203.
113. Id. at 205.
114. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
115. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 201-02.
116. Id. at 203-04.

1987]

FORECASTS FOR DISCRETION

383

ceasing to use data supplied by 6N12.117
In reaching different results, one point of disagreement between
the courts of appeal was the interpretation of Indian Towing. The Sec
ond Circuit reasoned that since the Coast Guard in Indian Towing was
under a duty to maintain the lighthouse in a manner which would not
undermine the reliance engendered, it therefore followed that the
Coast Guard in Eklof was under a duty to ensure that the reef was
marked appropriately and would not become a trap for the naviga
tor,l1S instead of a warning of the danger.
The Brown court declared that this application went too far. The
First Circuit inserted the facts before it into the Eklof formula and
reached a startling result: "The government established the service for
the benefit ... of [the] fishermen; fishermen relied upon it; the govern
ment knew they would rely on it; therefore the government induced
reliance; having induced reliance, it became obligated to use due
care."119 The First Circuit agreed that this formula was ostensibly
sound, but viewed the formula as proving too much, for, under its
reasoning, non-users would be the only parties to whom the discre
tionary function exception would apply.120
The First Circuit was also very critical of the manner in which
the Second Circuit applied the term "reliance." For the First Circuit,
the issue was not just reliance, but "justified reliance."121 The Brown
court concluded that there was a significant difference between a light
house and a navigational buoy. In Indian Towing, the Coast Guard
decided to mark the danger with a lighthouse; this was the extent of its
undertaking. The Coast Guard could be held liable, according to
Brown, only for failing to maintain the lighthouse as advertised, but
not for the extent to which it had marked the danger. 122 In Eklof, the
extent to which the Coast Guard marked Diamond Reef was with a
single buoy. This decision was, therefore, according to Brown, a dis
cretionary matter. The Coast Guard could be held accountable only if
it failed to maintain the buoy as advertised. 123
A further distinction between the two cases is that while both
suits were brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the two courts
applied the statute differently. This issue was for the most part not
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Brown, 790 F.2d at 200.
Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203.
Brown, 790 F.2d at 202.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
See Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1979).
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discussed by either court. One reason for the silence may be the con
troversy which the courts have created concerning the SIAA.
The Second Circuit, in Eklof, barely mentioned that the suit was
brought by the owners of the Reliable under the SIAA.124 It made
casual mention of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the SIAA while
discussing the Coast Guard's duty of care. 125 In concluding that the
Coast Guard must do whatever is necessary to ensure that the place
ment of the navigational aid does not create a new danger, the court
stated: "This [duty] is simply a consequence of the waiver of sovereign
immunity represented by the Suits in Admiralty Act ...."126 With
this reasoning, the Second Circuit upheld its earlier decisions and the
decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that the discretionary func
tion exception does not apply to actions brought under the SIAA.127
These courts of appeals have held that by amending the SIAA in 1960,
Congress attempted to cure only a jurisdictional problem within the
SIAA.128 Furthermore, courts have expressed the view that past ex
periences with the FTCA compelled Congress to exclude it from the
SIAA. The justification for this judicial interpretation is that the ex
clusion of the discretionary function exception will encourage careful
planning and implementation of activities by government agencies.
The Brown court never dealt with the implication of refusing to
apply the discretionary function exception to a claim brought under
the SIAA. For whatever reason, the court simply disregarded the is
sue, perhaps because the court considered it to be fully adjudicated
under the First Circuit's previous decisions. The First Circuit's view
is that the exception must be implied in the SIAA because the 1960
amendment opened the door for suits against the government based
124. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836 (2nd Cir. 1983) (under the
SIAA the United States waives sovereign immunity with respect to cases which fall under
46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982»; Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975) (the SIAA
contains no discretionary function exception; furthermore, the FfCA contains a specific
exception of claims for which the SIAA provides a remedy); De Bardeleben Marine Corp.
v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971) (amendments to the SIAA disavow govern
ment immunity in admiralty actions).
128. See S.REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS. 3583. The report indicated that due to the confusing language of the
SIAA as well as the Public Vessels Act, claimants spent an inordinate amount of time
deciding in which forum to bring their claims. The result was a massive amount of misfil
ings. The difficulty arose from the attempt to distinguish between merchant and public
vessel status. Id.
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upon the standard "as a private person would be."129 The argument
made is that Congress could not have overlooked the fact that the
agency being sued will of necessity have limited resources available
for the establishment of programs. 130 The argument is furthered by
the concern that by precluding the application of the discretionary
function exception, the taxpayers and the public treasury will be bur
dened unfairly because all claims will be paid by the public.!3! An
other concern of the First Circuit was that fear of judicial review will
result in inaction by agencies which traditionally act for the benefit of
the public good.!32
A.

The Circuits Switched

Despite the disagreements over the interpretation of Indian Tow
ing and the SIAA, the most important distinction between Brown and
Eklof is that the fishermen in Brown relied on a weather forecast,
rather than the buoy itself, as was the case for the navigators in Eklof
In the words of the First Circuit, "the representation was not the
129. See Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976) (the discretionary
function exception is implied in the SIAA), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). See also
Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984) (the discretionary function ex
ception does apply to the SIAA), rev'd, 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
938 (1987).
130. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the reasoning of the First
Circuit and now applies the discretionary function exception to the SIAA. See Hillier v.
Southern Towing Co., 714 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that there is no evidence that
by amending the SIAA Congress authorized the courts to subject the United States to novel
liabilities); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980) (1960 amendment to the
SIAA cured a jurisdictional problem only and Congress intended that the discretionary
function exception should still apply to the SIAA), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
131. Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 538-39 (1st Cir. 1976). The Supreme
Court, however, dismissed this concern in Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957). The Court ruled that the burden on the taxpayers of paying the costs of these suits
will be relatively light because the cost will be spread out among the taxpayers. Id. at 320.
132. See, Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and the Suits in Admiralty
Act: A Safe Harbor for Negligence?, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 385, 411 (1981). The
comment states that the legislative history is unclear and there is no certainty as to why
Congress did not legislate expressly that the discretionary function exception should not
apply to the SIAA. Id. The comment concludes that the fact that Congress did not pro
vide for the exception either expressly or by reference is circumstantial evidence that it did
not consider any of the FTCA exceptions necessary or applicable to the SIAA. Id. at 411
12. The conclusion is that the approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals
is favorable because of the legislative history, proper statutory construction, more equitable
results for injured parties, and encouragement of responsible agency operations which will
benefit the public. Id. at 413. The comment dismisses the concern of agency inaction
because that result simply has not occurred. Finally, the argument is made that if the pub
lic expense is of concern to Congress, Congress could always amend the SIAA and include
the discretionary function exception. Id.
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buoy, but the prediction."!33 The fact that the representation relied on
was a weather forecast weighed heavily on the mind of the court. The
court made reference to the inherent unreliability of weather forecasts
and expressed a reluctance to establish a reviewable duty of care in the
area of government weather forecasting.n 4 "A weather forecast is a
classic example of a prediction of indeterminate reliability, and a place
peculiarly open to debatable decisions, including the desirable degree
of investment of government funds and other resources."!35 The court
noted that weather forecasts "fail on frequent occasions."136
If the forecast itself were the only matter at issue, the First Cir
cuit's decision in Brown would be entirely consistent with other deci
sions dealing with liability of the federal government for negligent
weather forecasting. 137 Virtually all of the cases which address this
issue have ruled in favor of the government for two, reasons: a
weather forecast is a representation specifically exempted from review
by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h),138 and forecasting is never 100%
reliable.
The Brown court faced a factually more complicated setting
which dealt with government liability for weather forecasts. 139 Unlike
Brown, 790 F.2d at 203.
Id.
Id. at 204. To hold the NWS to a higher standard would undoubtedly force the
service to disclaim expressly the reliability of the weather forecasts, an uninviting and non
sensical prospect.
136. Id.
137. See Williams v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 746 (7th Cir. 1980). In that case, an
airplane pilot brought an action against the Federal Aviation Administration and the NWS
for failing to predict the weather accurately. The court, ruling for the government, said:
"Predicting the weather is not an exact science ... [and weather forecasting is a discretion
ary function exception to the FTCA]." Id. at 750. See National Mfg. Co. v. United States,
210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954). In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action under the FTCA
claiming the NWS had carelessly and negligently disseminated misinformation regarding
the course of floodwater. The court held that there was no cause of action for recovery of
damages from floods or floodwater and the weather service has a wide latitude of discretion
to determine whether in their opinion, a particular forecast is appropriate. The forecasts or
omissions of forecasts by the Bureau is a discretionary function. Id. at 750.
For an analysis of National Manufacturing, see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-The
Non Liability ofthe United States for Negligent Weather Forecasts, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
228,228-32 (1954) (arguing that unlike a radio station or newspaper, the weather bureau is
in the business of weather forecasting (warning) and should be held liable as a corporation
would be for acting negligently).
138. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1982) specifically says the government cannot be held lia
ble for any misrepresentations by its employees or services. For a listing of the other excep
tions to the FTCA see supra note 17.
139. See Chanon v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afJ'd, 480
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1973). In Chanon, the administrators of the estates of two deceased
fishermen brought suit against the United States under the FTCA claiming negligence on
133,
134.
135.
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the previous cases, there was an act or omission in Brown which made
the forecast less reliable than it would have been had the buoy been
functioning properly. The government in Brown knew about the pos
sibility of an inaccurate weather forecast because of 6N12, but did not
take any measures to warn of the possible consequences. l40
The Second Circuit probably would have ruled that the actions
taken by the government in Brown were reviewable and ultimately
negligent. The Second Circuit likely would reason that the nature of
the activity is irrelevant and it is the decision to act and create the
forecast which engenders reliance on the forecast and, therefore, the
government must use reasonable care in carrying out this activity.
While a reliance standard appears to be ostensibly sound, it is not the
standard Congress called for in the FfCA. Congress called for liabil
ity to be imposed on the federal government if, under the same cir
cumstances, a private person would be liable. 141
The question asked by the Brown court was whether the steps
taken by the government in Eklofwere reasonable. For the First Cir
cuit the answer to this depended upon congressional allocations of re
sources combined with the concept of justified reliance on the part of
the plaintiff. 142 To rule otherwise would cause the courts to second
guess the legislature, a task which the First Circuit refused to under
take. 143 Therefore, according to Brown, under all the circumstances
in Eklof the actions taken by the Coast Guard were reasonable be
cause limited resources were allocated to these agencies to undertake
the activities, and the buoy was positioned as advertised. The First
Circuit also applied standards not expressly set forth in the FfCA:
justified reliance was not contemplated by the Congress. It appears
that the circuits are applying judge-made rather than congressional
standards.
An inconsistency appears when one applies the justified reliance
the part of the government for its failure to disseminate accurate weather information. The
court held, that an erroneous forecast standing by itself is not actionable. Id. at 1041.
140. But see United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967). In that case, the Coast Guard attempted a rescue
mission which resulted in the sinking of the plaintiff's vessel. Id. at 191. The Coast Guard
apparently maintained inadequate equipment to complete the mission. Id. at 193-95. The
suit was brought under the FTCA, and the First Circuit, relying on Indian Towing, held
the Coast Guard liable because the Coast Guard must not induce reliance upon a belief that
it was providing something it was not. Id. at 195. The court considered the delinquent
equipment maintained on the boat, and also the fact that the boat was the only vessel
available to attempt the rescue mission. Id.
141. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
142. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202-04.
143. Id. at 204.
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reasoning to the facts of Brown, for it seems to mandate a finding of
liability. There is no doubt that the government was not employing
6N12 at the time of the storm; thus the forecast was not as reliable as
the government advertised it would be. The extent of the NWS under
taking was to employ 6N12 as a properly functioning weather obser
vation buoy.
It would be interesting to see what the First Circuit
would have ruled if the government had not expended resources to
attempt to repair or replace 6N12, or if the government lacked accu
rate information from all weather buoys in the area, but issued a fore
cast anyway. Perhaps, in the face of such facts, the court would have
imposed liability because of the sheer inadequacy of the equipment. In
Brown the overriding factor was, of course, the nature of the activity
relied upon: the weather forecast. 144 From its language, the First Cir
cuit implied that the government would still remain protected in this
instance even if it did nothing:
[I]n the case at bar, the government did not create the weather; it
merely failed, in the [lower] court's opinion, to render adequate per
formance. . . . [T]his was a discretionary undertaking . . . [by the
government, and the lower court] failed to respect the ... provision
... [in § 2680, which is] "whether or not the discretion involved
was abused."14S

In the court's opinion, the discretion was not abused by deciding to
issue weather forecasts for the area. 146
Obviously, the Second Circuit would disagree strongly with the
above reasoning. For the Second Circuit, the entire question revolved
around the standard of reasonableness. The Eklof court maintained
that the solution to the inconsistency in the cases dealing with govern
mental liability would be to apply the traditional negligence stan
dards: "The law of negligence teaches ... that one who acts must do
so reasonably in light of what is foreseeable and that reasonableness is
the threshold to liability."147
When this reasoning is applied to the facts of Eklof, the imposi
tion of liability seems logical and equitable. Since the Coast Guard
was aware of the other groundings at Diamond Reef, it was reasonably
foreseeable that the other accidents would occur. The court, however,
144. Brown, 790 F.2d at 204. But see Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877, 887
(D. Mass. 1984). The plaintiffs did not contend the government was negligent because the
weather forecast was incorrect, but rather because the government failed to replace 6N12.
Id.
145. Brown, 790 F.2d at 203 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982».
146. Id. at 202.
147. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
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carried this reasoning further than its application in Indian Towing
when it stated that "the Coast Guard must maintain navigational aids
in proper working order with whatever cost that entails, it also must
ensure that its placement of those aids does not create a new danger
"148
The court in Brown offered two reasons for disagreeing with the
conclusion that an agency must expend whatever resources are neces
sary to ensure safety. First, the court echoed the concern of the
Supreme Court in Varig that judicial interference in the area of legisla
tive allocation of resources would lead to undesirable results.149 The
argument is made in Brown that the courts are not in a position to
review how much money is available for certain agencies and their
respective undertakings. The allocation of finite resources is not a ju
dicial undertaking and therefore the only branch of government with
the ability to handle these matters is the legislature. ISO Second, if the
Coast Guard, or any agency, were subject to such strict standards the
result would be a reluctance to carry out their duties, duties which in
the long run benefit the public. l51 The response to these concerns is
that the courts have never had difficulty interpreting congressional in
tent, and the idea of judicial review would likely spur agency action
rather than inaction. ls2
It is difficult to envision that a reasonableness standard would re
sult from the application of the Eklof approach. Under Eklof reason
ing, the discretionary function exception seems to be stripped of its
purpose.IS 3 A slight change in the surrounding environment which
148. Id. (citations omitted).
149. Brown, 790 F.2d at 204. One of the possible results suggested by the Supreme
Court in Varig is that federal courts could become a forum for arguments on the allocation
of federal tax dollars to government agencies, a task much better left to the legislature.
Varig, 467 U.S. at 814.
150. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. The argument is based on the separation of powers
enunciated in the United States Constitution. The First Circuit in Brown was echoing this
argument from the earlier cases: Varig, 467 U.S. 797; Dalehite v. United States, 345 U.S.
15 (1953); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980). cert. denied. 449 U.S. 837
(1980); Gercey V. United States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977).
151. In contrast to this concern, one article suggests that fear of liability for negligent
decisions will lead to desirable results. See Comment. supra note 133. For example, if the
Coast Guard knew in Indian Towing of the possible consequences of the failed light it
would have been compelled to inspect the light. See supra note 98. The argument is made
that lack of a discretionary function exception to the SIAA has not resulted in undesirable
results as the First and Seventh Circuits might suggest. There has been no discernible rate
of inaction by government agencies.
152. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
153. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202.
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would go undetected during a routine inspection of a marked site or
the placement of a buoy could, under certain circumstances, be found
to have been unreasonable and thus negligent. The Eklof court would
probably dismiss this concern and rejoin that the government would
be held liable only for foreseeable consequences. IS4 It does, however,
seem illogical to hold a government agency with limited resources lia
ble under this standard, because it is necessarily constrained by con
gressional appropriations which are, of course, discretionary.
Perhaps the best way to show the future effect of the Eklof ap
proach is to apply the standards to a further situation. If the Coast
Guard had marked Diamond Reef with four or five buoys and an acci
dent occurred, the result conceivably would be liability on the part of
the government. This outcome is possible because it would be for a
jury to determine whether the marking was reasonable and whether,
once the Coast Guard undertook the marking, it was required to ex
pend whatever resources were necessary to make the reef danger
proof. Similarly, if the facts of Brown were before the Second Circuit,
the government arguably would have been held liable for the negligent
forecast because it failed to expend whatever resources necessary to
make the forecast accurate, a duty the government incurred by estab
lishing a weather service. ISS
IV.

A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION

A.

The Need for an Amendment

The choice must be made whether to allow government agencies
to act with discretion or subject them to a strict standard of review.
The decision reached by the First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap
peals seems appropriate. 156 These courts reason that it is better for
the government to undertake the activity and perform to the extent of
its resources. If the courts choose to follow the reasoning of the Sec
ond, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,157 the government official may
choose to not act at all. The counter argument is that, realistically,
agencies will not cease their activity and deprive the navigator of "half
a loaf, usually thought better than none,"ISS but rather the actions
154. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204.
155. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
158. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202 n.5. The First Circuit used this phrase when discussing
the implications of non action by government agencies. The phrase clarifies the court's
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taken truly will benefit the public. 159 The problem with this view is
that it undermines the scope of the discretionary function exception. 160
Is half the loaf usually better than none? A navigator who sees
one buoy and follows standard operational procedures stands a much
greater chance of avoiding a disaster than one who has no navigational
buoy to follow. The same can be said for the lobster fisherman who
will undoubtedly benefit in the long run from the weather forecasts
provided by the NWS. Unfortunate circumstances will sometimes re
sult, but the strong argument remains that it is better to act than not.
There may be a need for a more accurate weather service or more
accurate marking of navigational dangers, but this is not an area
where a reasonable standard of care rationally can be applied. The
application of this standard may produce judicial second-guessing of
legislative decisions and the imposition of unwarranted liabilities on
government agencies.
The solution to the inconsistent application of the FTCA among
the United States Courts of Appeals is not readily apparent. Perhaps a
ruling by the Supreme Court concerning issues similar to those posed
in Brown and Eklof would provide an answer. The Court previously
has ruled that the judicial branch of the government should be reluc
tant to venture into areas traditionally governed by the legislature. 161
The Court's present point of view is that agency action is better than
inaction and that such a strict standard of review placed upon govern
ment agencies might very well result in a cessation of action. 162 Inher
opinion that the imposition of strict standards upon the government will have devastating
effects on the agencies.
159. See supra note 131.
160. Brown, 790 F. 2d at 202. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text. The
original intent behind the discretionary function exception was to insure that unprece
dented liabilities were not placed upon the government, and that the government would
remain strong due to the freedom of agency decisionmaking. See also w. Katzke, The
Convergence of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act with
Limitations of Liability in Common Law Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 221 (1986).
The article argues that the courts should take into consideration various factors in deter
mining whether government activity falls within the discretionary function exception, in
cluding the ability of the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the conduct or decision;
whether it is an area where the courts should be intruding, the extent and seriousness of the
injury, and the relationship between the government and private interests in each situation.
[d. at 285.
161. See supra notes 10-61 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Yarig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). The Supreme Court
in Varig dealt with a policy judgment by a regulatory agency dissimilar to an agency such
as NWS. See Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984), rev'd, 790 U.S.
199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987). The Supreme Court in Varig offered
a test to determine whether liability should be imposed on a regulator. The first question to
be asked under this test is whether the government is acting in its role as a regulator of the
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ent in agency action are certain risks encountered by officials who plan
and implement policies. The risks are not discounted by the officials;
rather, they are balanced against the benefits to the public good. If the
benefits outweigh the risks, the policy is implemented.
In light of the nature of the activity undertaken combined with
the efforts to repair 6N12, the First Circuit opinion in Brown would
likely be upheld by the Supreme Court. The relevant precedent ap
plied would be Indian Towing and Varig Airlines. The Court would
have to distinguish reliance on a weather forecast and a lighthouse,
ultimately balancing its conclusion against the pro-governmental im
munity language in Varig. Cognizant of the Second Circuit opinion in
Eklof, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to impose liability on the
government for the discretionary undertaking. Again, the court
would need to balance the issue of reliance with the current Court
position on discretion.

B.

The Proposed Amendment

The ultimate solution to the problem is to be found within the
legislature. Perhaps the cure for judicial inconsistency would be for
Congress to incorporate a reliance standard into the FTCA. This
could be done by amending the discretionary function exception to
read:
Section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to (a) any claim based
upon an act or omission of an employee of the government exercis
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation whether or
not such regulation be valid, or upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government
whether or not the discretion be abused. But if in the execution of
such discretion the government should cause a claimant to justifiably
rely upon the exercise or peiformance of the function or duty, the
government may under the circumstances be held liable.

This amendment would serve two purposes. The courts would at last
have a mandate to apply a standard which they have been eager to
utilize. Secondly, since the reliance standard has precedential legiti
conduct of private individuals; second, whether the conduct of the government employee as
opposed to his or her status, is "of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield
from tort liability." Varig, 467 U.S. at 813. If the Supreme Court were to find that the
NWS is a regulator of private individual's conduct, the government would need to prove as
it apparently has, that its conduct in not replacing 6N12 is the type that Congress intended
to shield from liability.
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macy, the courts would be prohibited from venturing into new stan
dards of liability. Thus, the end result should be consistency.
By incorporating this terminology into the discretionary function
exception, the congressional Act would appear to be consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding in Indian Towing. 163 In an identical situ
ation, a claimant would need to establish that, through the exercise of
the discretion, the government caused the plaintiff to rely justifiably on
the establishment of the lighthouse. However, assuming such an
adoption, it does not appear likely that a court would impose liability
on the government for a negligent forecast because of the inherent un
reliability of forecasts. To prevail, the plaintiff would need to prove
that, under the circumstances, the government caused a reasonable
person justifiably to rely on the forecast. If the government were
found liable, the case would not establish a precedent for all negligent
forecasts, just those regarding which the plaintiff established justifiable
reliance. In a scenario of a misplaced or mispositioned navigational
buoy, the plaintiff would need to show that a reasonable person under
all of the circumstances would have justifiably relied on the placement
of the buoy.
The reliance standard will not necessarily undermine the purpose
of the discretionary function exception. Rather, it will provide the dis
cretion asked for by Congress and also provide a standard by which
aggrieved parties can bring a cause of action. The reliance standard,
while totally absent from the legislative history, may actually help to
further the original intent of Congress in enacting the FfCA. Injured
parties will be able to present their cases in a judicial forum but, in
order to do so, they will need to meet a specific reliance standard. It
seems unlikely that this standard will invite more actions against the
government, because the burden of proof will be clearly established
prior to the beginning of litigation. The statute will not require the
plaintiff to prove the merits of the case prior to litigation, but rather
will force the plaintiff to focus on the issues to determine whether the
action is justified.

v.

CONCLUSION

The courts are in desperate need of further legislative clarity. Un
less the courts receive such guidance in interpreting the scope of the
FfCA, the discretionary function exception, and the SIAA, the gov
ernment will find that it is liable in some courts for actions ruled im
163. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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mune from liability in others. The prospect of future inconsistency
places an unfair burden upon government agencies seeking to imple
ment beneficial programs nationwide.
Martin D. Auffredou

